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This article begins by showing that not all developing countries
concentrate their exports in products which make intensive use of natural
resources or cheap labour, and that those which also export some products
typical of more developed countries tend to grow faster, apparently
independently of their human capital endowment or the quality of their
institutions. For this purpose, an index is used which measures the degree
to which each country displays this type of export mix. This is an
idiosyncratic phenomenon which seems to be linked with the capacity to
undertake the production and export of new products. There is therefore a
place for incentive policies, accompanied by the ability of the government
to recognize failed attempts and to stop subsidizing them. Because of the
idiosyncratic nature of the phenomenon, it is not possible to propose
universal solutions, but the author does set out ten principles to be borne
in mind in policy design in each country.
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I
Introduction
Great ideas never die, and in many ways some of the
key ideas spearheaded by Raúl Prebisch –one of the
greatest Latin American economists who ever lived–
are very much back in vogue. Prebisch thought that
the economic structure really makes a difference: that
what countries produce –whether they specialize in
primary industries or in manufacturing– makes a real
difference to their economic performance. This idea,
which in some respects is a very plausible one,
disappeared from the consciousness of most North
American trained economists in the last couple of
decades, but I think it is fair to say that now it is coming
back. Indeed, the main theme of this presentation will
be to elaborate on that idea –that what you produce
matters– and try to draw some policy implications
from that proposition.
This idea is at variance with much of the economic
philosophy that guided policy makers in the 1980s and
1990s, not only in Latin America and the Caribbean
but all over the world. The basic idea that motivated
the economic reforms made in those decades was that
policy makers only had to concern themselves with the
broad framework: that is to say, that once you
established macroeconomic stability and provided the
basic parameters of a functioning market economy, with
an appropriate regulatory structure, then essentially you
could leave the market economy to take care of itself
and assign resources efficiently in both a static and a
dynamic sense, on the assumption that the economy
would generate economic growth on its own and that
such growth would be automatic once macroeconomic
stability was in place and the market fundamentals were
in operation.
We are now learning, however, that while many of
the reforms undertaken in the 1990s –especially those
in the macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary fields– were
absolutely necessary, in certain respects some of the
other reforms may not have been particularly well
targeted on the factors that really generate economic
growth. In this respect, it is important to have a better
understanding of how the productive structure
contributes to the growth process, what that structure
is, and what that implies for policy design in both the
micro and macro spheres.
II
The productive structure and
the quality of the export basket
I am now going to argue that the productive structure
matters for economic growth; that the kinds of goods
produced are important, and that the economic
fundamentals and comparative advantages in and of
themselves do not really determine the productive
structure: there is a certain element of arbitrariness, a
certain idiosyncratic nature, in what a country actually
ends up producing, and the role of public strategies, in
the best of all possible worlds, is not to predetermine
what a country can or can not produce, but to ensure
that it ends up producing those types of goods which
are most growth-generating. In fact, when we look
closely at the details of how successful industries are
actually generated –how they “get off the ground”– we
find that in almost all such cases public intervention
has played a significant role.
The basic argument in support of the above, at the
most general level, is that growth strategies are needed
to complement the pursuit of macroeconomic stability
with a more productive economic strategy that focuses
on the needs of the real sector and does not just assume
This article is based on the Fifth Raúl Prebisch Memorial Lecture,
delivered by the author at the Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile, 31 August 2005).
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that, once the macro framework is in place, the real
sector will take care of itself and will generate the
dynamism needed for sustained growth. That leads us
to the question of what such a policy framework consists
of: a really difficult question because, on the one hand,
there has been relatively little serious research,
especially by economists, on what we think an
appropriate industrial policy framework for low and
middle income countries might be, but also because as
soon as we start thinking about such policy frameworks
we immediately become aware once again of the
importance of the specific context and the need that
such frameworks must function well. In order for this
to be so they must obey some general principles: they
need to be highly specific, they must take advantage of
the institutional endowment that the country already
possesses –which differs from setting to setting– and
they must respond to the specific constraints or
obstacles that the individual countries face, which
likewise differ from setting to setting. Consequently,
there is not really a whole lot that one can say about
the nature of these policies that is very concrete or
operational; all that one can do is to set forth as fully as
possible the general design principles for their
formulation that need to be taken into account in
constructing the policy framework, so that policy
makers will at least have some guidelines for this task.
I will now refer to two aspects of these general
principles, one being the need to balance the “carrots”
and the “sticks”, the discipline and the rewards, when
designing industrial promotion strategies, and the
second being the need for the public authorities, and
specifically the public agencies entrusted with
productive restructuring, to strike a balance between
insulation and embeddedness. On the one hand, they
need to be sufficiently insulated from private interests,
so that they cannot be captured by them and be “in
their pockets”, but on the other hand they need to be
sufficiently embedded within those private interests, so
that they can obtain enough information about where
action is needed and what form it should take.
Let me start with an example which I think is quite
striking, taken from an article by Imbs and Wacziarg
(2003).1 Those authors looked at what happens with
regard to the concentration of production during the
process of economic development, as shown in figures
1 and 2. The vertical axis of both figures is a Gini index
1 See J. Imbs and R.Wacziarg (2003), Stages of diversification,
American Economic Review, vol. 93, No. 1, Nashville, Tennessee.
FIGURE 1
Gini index for employment
versus income level
(Non-parametric estimated curve)a
Per capita income in purchasing power parity dollars
Source: J. Imbs and R. Wacziarg (2003), Stages of diversification,
American Economic Review, Nashville, Tennessee, American
Economic Association, March.
a United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
3-digit employment data.
FIGURE 2
Gini index for value added
versus income level
(Non-parametric estimated curve)a
Per capita income in purchasing power parity dollars
Source: J. Imbs and R. Wacziarg (2003), Stages of diversification,
American Economic Review, Nashville, Tennessee, American
Economic Association, March.
a United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)





































that relates to either the concentration of employment
(figure 1) or that of production (figure 2), across
different sectors of the economy. Thus, in an economy
in which production is highly concentrated in a single
sector, the Gini coefficient is extremely high, whereas
in a very diversified economy the Gini coefficient for
production or employment would be very low. The
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horizontal axis of both figures shows different levels
of income which roughly reflect the evolution of
concentration in the course of development. These two
economists analyze growth across countries as well as
within them over time, so the comments made below
are a valid description of a dynamic and do not merely
reflect a cross country regularity.
Imbs and Wacziarg found that as countries go from
very low levels of income to higher levels, their
production pattern becomes much more diversified, and
that at sufficiently high levels of income the
corresponding curve starts to turn around, which means
that a process of concentration begins to take hold. If we
look at the turning-point, that is to say, the level of income
at which economies start to become more concentrated
again, we see that this point is very high, and has not yet
been reached in any country of the region. We should
therefore concentrate our attention on what happens in
the declining part of this curve, which indicates that as
countries are becoming less poor, their production
structure becomes more and more diversified, or at least
if they start from being very concentrated they become
less concentrated as they become richer.
From one perspective, this should not come as a
surprise at all, but from another perspective, in the case
of those who studied for a doctorate in economics in a
North American university at any time in the last three
or four decades and internalized the policy implications
of what they were taught there, leaving aside everything
else they might have heard, it could reasonably be
assumed –without wishing to deprecate the value of
that kind of education in any way– that they were told
that in order for a country to get rich and free itself
from poverty, it must specialize according to its
comparative advantages, and that the difference
between countries that were doing well and those that
were doing poorly was that the former had decided to
exploit their comparative advantages, that is to say, to
allocate their resources where they could be best used
for realizing that principle, whereas the latter set of
countries had done the reverse: i.e., they had not
followed the dictates of comparative advantage. Figures
1 and 2, however, show that to a first and second degree
of approximation that story cannot be right as a general
description of what drives development, because if it
had been right, the countries that would be breaking
out of the ranks of poverty would be those that were
becoming more concentrated in their production
structure: that is to say, the countries which were
specializing, rather than those which were becoming
more diversified.
The key point in this respect is that, whatever the
role that trade and comparative advantage may have
played in the development of those countries, the
dynamic that drives growth is not fundamentally linked
to any notion of static comparative advantage; on the
contrary, it is a dynamic which somehow leads some
countries to gradually diversify their investments into
a whole range of new activities. Thus, the most
prosperous countries are those where new investments
are being made in new areas, while the countries that
have failed are those where this has not taken place.
My own recent research –much of it jointly with
Ricardo Hausmann, at the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard– takes a particular approach
to this issue in order to quantify some of these
relationships and to look for their implications. What
we have done is to develop an indicator that measures
the quality of the countries’ export basket. In order to
do this, we first calculated for each product traded (at a
fairly disaggregated 6-digit level, so that we are really
talking about thousands and thousands of different
commodities) the average income level PRODY(j)2 of
the countries which have exhibited a revealed
comparative advantage in that commodity. In other
words, we associate with each commodity a particular
income level and we take that level as the representative
income level corresponding to a country which has a
strong comparative advantage in that commodity. Thus,
for example, jute is a very low-income commodity,
while aircraft are a very high-income commodity,
because the countries that have strong comparative
advantages in jute tend to be lower-income countries
and aircraft are a high-income commodity because the
countries that export aircraft have high incomes.
Having calculated this commodity-based indicator,
we aggregated across different countries by simply
taking their weighted average PRODY(j), using as a
weighting factor the share of each product in their
export basket. We call this indicator EXPY: a quantitative
indicator which is our measure of the quality of the
export basket of a country, since it measures the income
level associated with that basket. This is one way of
quantifying what a country actually produces and the
mix of products that that country has developed mastery
in producing. It does this by aggregating different goods
on the basis of the income levels associated with the factors
giving rise to the respective comparative advantages.
2 PRODY(j) = average income level of countries with a comparative
advantage for the production of a good j (6-digit Harmonized
System).
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It is not surprising, then, that (as shown in figure 3)
a scatter plot of this EXPY measure against the income
levels of different countries reveals a high correlation.
This correlation is very high almost by definition,
confirming that the rich countries are those that export
typical rich countries’ goods. What interests me most,
however, is not the overall correlation, but the deviations
from the regression line: why is it that some countries
are significantly above the regression line and some
countries are below it, and can this have actual
implications for economic performance?
There are about a hundred or so countries in this
scatter plot, but we will focus on India and China,
because they diverge from the mean. It is very
interesting that two countries which have been doing
extremely well in recent decades have much higher
levels of EXPY than would be expected on the basis of
their income level and are thus much further above the
regression line than other countries.
China, which is particularly far above that line, is
currently exporting a set of commodities –most of them
based on electronics, consumer electronics and so forth–
which are associated with the income levels of countries
with much higher incomes than China; in fact, the
income level associated with that country’s export
basket is six times higher than China’s aggregate income
level.
Let us now look at the same situation from a
somewhat different angle: over time. Figure 4 shows,
for a number of Asian and Latin American countries,
how this index which measures the quality of export
baskets has changed over time and how these different
countries rank against each other. There are four Latin
American countries in the figure: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Mexico. It is interesting to note that the first
three of those countries, (Argentina, Brazil and Chile)
have the lowest EXPY levels in this comparison, i.e.,
the lowest income content of exports, whereas China’s
level is close to that of the Asian group and Mexico,
and its gap with the latter country has closed
significantly over time. This is surprising, because
China is still much poorer, compared to these Latin
American countries, yet it is exporting a set of goods
that are much more sophisticated than those exported
FIGURE 3
Selected countries: Scatter plot of income content of
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by them. This is partly because of the relatively greater
natural resource endowments of the Latin American
countries, but I think this is only part of the picture.
If you were to show this to your average
neoclassical economist steeped in the tradition of
comparative advantage, he or she would say that all
that this shows is that countries like China, or South
Korea, or Taiwan, or Singapore, which have developed
highly sophisticated export baskets, have simply wasted
resources by allocating them in areas where they do
not have one of the authentic comparative advantages
–that of possessing skills which have already been
developed– so that in reality these export baskets have
been purchased at too high a cost. Therefore, it is
important to look at the implications of whether this
really matters: whether this particular cross-section of
export structure and production structure shows up in
the figures as an important predictor of something that
we care about. The answer to this question is very much
“yes”.
Our concentration on this particular measure of
export baskets is justified because it turns out that this
measure is a quantitatively significant and robust
predictor of subsequent economic growth, since
countries that latch on somehow to these higher-quality
export baskets subsequently register much higher levels
of growth than countries that do not. The partial scatter
plot in figure 5 shows the growth rate of per capita GDP
over a ten-year period, compared with the initial value
(in 1992) of the EXPY indicator for different countries,
controlling for other factors that are normally included
in a growth regression. Essentially, what it shows (after
controlling for the initial levels of income and human
capital in different countries) is that countries which
have managed to generate export baskets that are
associated with higher income levels have converged
much more rapidly. In other words, if you latch on to
these higher-productivity goods, these productivity
levels spread to the rest of the economy. That is the
dynamic that really drives the process of economic
South Korea Hong Kong Special China
Administrative Region
Argentina Brazil Mexico Chile
Source: Prepared by the author.
FIGURE 4
Latin America and East Asia: Income
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growth; this is what explains why a country like China,
by producing goods like mobile telephones,
refrigerators and television sets, is able to generate much
higher productivity gains and spread them to the rest
of the economy than it would have been able to do if China
had simply produced garments, shoes and toys. This
explains the significant normative interest of this particular
measure of what a country produces and exports.
Furthermore, when it is sought to explain why
certain countries have much higher-quality export
baskets than others, most of the factors that are usually
considered do not have a lot of explanatory power. As
figures 6 and 7 show, neither human capital endowment
nor some measure of overall institutional quality help
very much to explain why different countries have
different levels of EXPY, after controlling for per capita
GDP. As we already showed, there is a relationship
between EXPY and per capita GDP, but that basically
summarizes practically everything that we know, since
we do not get much greater explanatory power by
including other measures of factor endowment or
institutional quality.
It is not possible to explain why China and India
have so much more sophisticated export baskets, either
on the basis of their relatively high endowments of
human capital, or some factor such as a better
institutional environment, which may have promoted
specialization in the production of more sophisticated
goods through some indirect comparative advantage
channel. Thus, there are many idiosyncratic elements
and, I would argue, a good deal of room for suitable
policies to make a difference in the creation of the
basket of goods produced, which can help the country
in question to grow. What a country produces and
exports –the products it becomes good at exporting–















































Selected countries: Per capita GDP growth, 1992-2003









































Source: Prepared by the author.
a Controlling for initial income and human capital.
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FIGURE 6























































































































Source: Prepared by the author.
FIGURE 7
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III
Patterns of specialization and
the cost discovery process
The idiosyncratic and (within certain limits) somewhat
arbitrary nature of the pattern of specialization can be
analyzed from a number of different standpoints. If we
analyze at the detailed level what the different countries
are specializing in, we see the arbitrariness of this pattern.
Bangladesh and Pakistan, for example, are two countries
that look virtually identical in terms of their overall
endowments of factors that support comparative
advantages. One would not expect these two countries to
exhibit different patterns of specialization, and at a broad
level that is obviously true: neither country is exporting
aircraft or semiconductors. On the other hand, when we
look in greater detail at the areas in which they are actually
specializing, we see big differences: Pakistan specializes
in the production of soccer balls, which it manufactures
in large numbers, while Bangladesh does none of this, but
on the other hand some of the things that Bangladesh
exports are hardly found at all in Pakistan. And if one
runs up or down the income chain comparing what pairs
of countries export, one finds lots of puzzling situations:
for example, comparing South Korea and Taiwan, why is
it that South Korea is one of the world’s biggest –if not
the biggest– producers of microwave ovens, while Taiwan
virtually does not export such ovens, and likewise, Taiwan
supplies most of the world market for bicycles, except for
some of the most sophisticated models, while South Korea
exports virtually no bicycles.
These are the kind of idiosyncratic elements
underlying the fact that some countries develop a
mastery that cannot simply be explained through
comparative advantages or economic fundamentals: in
these cases, one needs to understand how these things
happen, particularly when, as I have been arguing, they
affect subsequent development. The theoretical
explanation for this indeterminacy, which leaves room
for these idiosyncratic patterns of specialization or
arbitrary forms of specialization to occur, is the idea
that, for certain economically well-grounded reasons,
freely functioning markets generally fail to supply
sufficient investments in new, non-traditional activities.
There are many reasons for this, but the two that I would
like to emphasize in particular are coordination
externalities and information externalities.
Coordination externalities refer to the idea that, in
order for any new activity to be profitable, it needs to
be accompanied at the same time by substantial
investments elsewhere in the horizontal or vertical
production chain. Thus, if you are thinking of investing
in pineapples in a country which has not previously
had significant skills in pineapple production and
export, you may also need to make sure that a pineapple
packaging plant is going to be constructed. On the other
hand, if you are thinking of investing in a pineapple
packaging plant, you will want to make sure that a
reliable supply of domestic pineapples will be grown,
because without these two investments being undertaken
simultaneously, neither one of them can be profitable;
without some coordination of investments across these
different activities you may well end up without a
pineapple industry, whereas this could very well have
been developed if such coordination had taken place.
There are many different types of information
externalities, but the one that I am most concerned with
here is the externality that attaches to what I call the
“cost discovery process”. One of the most important
things that entrepreneurs do in a developing country is
to discover the underlying cost structure of the
economy: that is, how much will it actually cost to
produce, say, pineapples in the local economy, once
the necessary modifications in off-the-shelf technology
have been made, and can they be produced profitably
or not. Entrepreneurship is of course always full of
uncertainties like this, but in low- and middle-income
countries there is an important externality associated
with the process that operates along the following lines:
if you are the first entrepreneur to invest in pineapples
and discover their production cost, and if it finally turns
out that you have made a mistake and that you are not
in an economy where you can produce pineapples
profitably, your losses are entirely private, and you must
bear them all yourself, but if instead you have
discovered that you can in fact produce pineapples in
that country very cheaply and profitably, there is then
likely to be a process of entry and diffusion and
imitation by other entrepreneurs: this means that you
cannot retain or appropriate the full benefits of that
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discovery, so the gains end up being socialized, whereas
the losses are private. This is the fundamental
asymmetry of any cost discovery process, and this is
why cost discovery is generally under-financed in
economies with a low level of diversification, so that
investments in new non-traditional activities are
generally under-financed too.
This means that in these kinds of settings there is a
lot of indeterminacy, depending on idiosyncratic factors
of luck, the quality of entrepreneurship, what the
government does, what it does not do, who you are
neighbours with and who you are not, which foreign
investor enters the country and which does not, and so
forth. Sometimes efforts are made to fill in some of the
gaps in this wide range of products which could
potentially be produced but apparently are not, but in
other cases big holes are left where this is not being
done. The question is what public policy can do in these
kinds of settings: can it play a successful role in making
sure that when such investments in new activities are
under-financed, the level of investment can be
systematically raised through government action?
IV
The contribution of industrial policies
Policy can and often does play such a role. Let us look
at a couple of examples of how policy does this in
practice. Real exchange rate policy can play a very
important role in this respect. The real exchange rate is
the most potent form of industrial policy imaginable,
because an undervalued real exchange rate is an across-
the-board subsidy for industries producing
internationally tradable goods: an area of activity where
exchange rate-related problems are particularly severe
and the benefits of discovering new tradable activities
are all that much greater because you have the whole
world to supply before returns and profits begin to
diminish. The scatter plot in figure 8 shows the
relationship between a measure of real exchange rate
overvaluation during the 1994-2003 period and the
quality of the export basket, as indicated by the level
of EXPY at the end of the period, controlling for its initial
level. The question here is: regardless of the export
baskets inherited in 1994, did the levels of the real
exchange rate registered after that date make any
difference to the quality of those export basket some
ten or twelve years later, and the answer is that they
did. Once again, India and China are outstanding cases
in this figure. In general, countries that are near the
origin in figure 8 are countries that had relatively
undervalued real exchange rates, while the countries
that are far away from the origin are countries that had
relatively overvalued exchange rates over this period,
and indeed one of the things that stands out in China’s
performance is that it has been underpinned by a very
competitive real exchange rate.
In the context of the theory that I have just briefly
described, a competitive real exchange rate, by
increasing the relative profitability of real tradable
activities (all other factors being equal), increases the
number of investments in tradable sectors that become
profitable and therefore probabilistically increases the
number of profitable industries that get off the ground
and eventually become successful. There therefore
really is a relationship between the level of the real
exchange rate and the quality of exports, although one
might expect quite the opposite: that a highly
depreciated real exchange rate is a way of lowering
labour costs, thus making the country in question more
competitive at the lower end of the product spectrum
and leading to specialization in labour-intensive
products. It turns out in practice, however, that a highly
depreciated exchange rate tends to cause countries to
rise in the product spectrum in the long run rather than
pushing them down. I cannot emphasize this point about
the exchange rate too strongly, because this is an area
where we have a highly valid alternative role for the
exchange rate, contrasting with the consensus that
prevailed in Latin America until recently with only a
few exceptions (the main one, of course, being the
policies pursued by Argentina in this respect).
The argument behind this consensus was that
basically the exchange rate should not be a policy
variable and that Central Banks and governments should
not set either a nominal or a real exchange rate target,
since that rate was an equilibrium variable that should
be left in complete freedom, except for perhaps just
smoothing out short-term fluctuations. From the
standpoint of productive diversification, this strikes me
as an unsatisfactory stand because it flies in the face of
the evidence that we have, which is that competitive
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real exchange rates have been a necessary if not
sufficient condition for sustained economic growth in
developing countries and that by leaving out the
exchange rate as a policy variable, removing it from
the range of policies open to governments, we are
thereby obliging them to apply industrial policy in a
more makeshift way, since if the real exchange rate does
not assist the tradable sectors, then this increases the
pressure to adopt makeshift policies of the type that I
will be considering below.
Policy also matters because when we look at the
non-traditional export industries which have been most
successful in Latin America (leaving out natural
resource-based industries and traditional export
industries like garments), we find time after time that
some of the most successful cases have been due to the
application of various types of industrial policy, State
intervention, public-private cooperation, and
preferential policies on the part of some other countries.
In Chile, which is a country that is often held up,
by those who do not know it well, as a sort of a free-
market miracle, some of the key non-traditional, non-
copper exports were the result of intelligent public
strategies of very varied kinds, ranging from salmon,
which benefitted from the research and development
and technological assistance efforts of Fundación Chile,
to forestry, which was promoted by a few subsidies in
the Pinochet era: for all the market-based
fundamentalism of that regime, there was one area
where explicit industrial policies were applied, and that
was the forestry sector.
In the case of Mexico, we should not forget the
role of the preferential tariff policies applied under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These
are simply industrial policies under a different guise,
because they are really just another way of making the
playing field uneven: compared with export subsidies,
for example, they have the advantage that somebody
FIGURE 8
Selected countries: Association between overvaluation of the real
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Source: Prepared by the author.
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else ends up paying the price rather than the exporting
country, but in many respects they work in a similar
way. Thus, none of the cases listed in Box 1 are the
result of markets just working on their own, “level
playing fields” and the like.
A final example of how policy matters is provided
by China. That country has relied extensively on direct
investment, but of course it has done so in a very
strategic way, and transnational corporations wishing
to enter and operate in China have been required to
team up with domestic firms, as shown in table 1. It is
now recognized that part of the success of foreign direct
investments in China is due precisely to the fact that
they have been a collaborative exercise between
domestic (mostly State-owned) and foreign firms. This
view of corporate ownership structure is interesting
because the industries are not dominated by foreign
firms but are joint ventures, and an important point to
note in this respect is that these firms, by being able to
transfer technology and enjoying the benefits of State
protection, were able to generate capabilities in the
hands of domestic investors, which would not have
occurred otherwise. In this sense, China is very different
from a typical Latin American country: in Latin
America, there would not be this pattern of a
preponderance of joint ventures, and instead wholly-
owned foreign firms would be much more prevalent.
It can therefore be said that Chinese preferences,
strategies and policies undoubtedly made a difference
as to the kind of industries that the country would
specialize in, and some of these firms eventually
became extremely successful: the IBM/Great Wall joint
venture shown in table 1 recently bought IBM’s personal
computer business, and is now one of the world’s largest
PC manufacturers. I hope I have put forward a
reasonably interesting and convincing argument about
two things so far: i) that what a country produces matters,
and that the production structure should therefore be a
major policy concern, and ii) that there are many ways
in which policies can influence the production structure,
and they can therefore play an important role in
determining the pattern of specialization.
Box  1
LATIN AMERICAN NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORT SUCCESS STORIES
Brazil: steel, aircraft, and (to an important extent) shoe production are all due to import substitution
industrialization, receive subsidized credit, and in the case of aircraft production, are State-owned.
Chile: salmon production was due to the efforts of Fundación Chile; the grape industry was the result of
public research and development activities in  the 1960s, and forestry received subsidies in the past.
Mexico: motor vehicle production was initially due to import substitution industrialization policies and later
benefited from preferential tariff policies under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Top five export items to the United States in 2000a
Country Item Value (millions of dollars)










Mexico Motor vehicles 15 771
Crude oil 11 977
Computers and peripherals 6 411
Ignition wiring sets 5 576
Trucks 4 853
a Using the 4-digit Harmonized System.
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V
Policy formulation
The foregoing has important implications for policy
formulation, and here again we encounter the difficulty
of how little we know in this respect. Any kind of
appropriate policy in this area will have to be devised
within the country in question by people who know its
institutional endowments well, for there is no such thing
as a manual of industrial policy, or a set of do’s and don’ts
to be applied across the board. What we can do is to try to
formulate a set of general principles that we think all good
policy frameworks should obey, leaving the details of the
TABLE 1
China: Major consumer electronics firms, by ownership type
Market segment Foreign-owned Joint venture Non-FDIa





Personal computers – HP – IBM/Great Wall – Lenovo (previously Legend)
– Dell – Toshiba/Toshiba Computer – Founder
 (Shanghai) – Tongfang
– Epson/Start
– Taiwan GVC/TCL
“Brown” goods – Sony/SVA – Changhong
– Philips/Suzhou CTV – Konka
– Toshiba/Dalian Daxian – Hisense




“White” goods – Siemens – Samsung/Suzhou – Changling







– Hong Leong (SG)/Xinfei
– Toshiba Carrier/Midea
Source: Prepared by the author.
a FDI = Foreign Direct Investment.
design to the individual countries and their policy makers.
This area is no different from any of the other areas that
we have been concerned with, so if the objectives pursued
are fiscal sustainability and inflation control, their
importance will warrant their being incorporated as general
principles of good policy, but the manner in which they
are to be achieved will obviously depend to a large extent
on what is feasible in each case; the actual instruments
and the operational agenda required by those objectives
will have to be designed in detail at home.
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The same can be said with regard to the provision
of an appropriate institutional environment for the
protection of property rights. Recognition of the
importance of property rights may be a desideratum of
economic policy, but when it comes to determining how
to protect those desired rights in practice, this cannot
be done in general, all-embracing terms. Some
countries, such as China or Vietnam, may find it easier
and more effective to provide effective property rights
for investors through highly heterodox arrangements,
while others may find that it is easier just to import
Western codes and legislation and blueprints off the
shelf. This is really a general issue, and industrial policy
and productive policies in general are no exception as
regards the impossibility of establishing a very specific
concrete agenda. So what can we say as regards general
guidelines?
I should like to emphasize a couple of points in
this respect. One is that these arrangements need to have
both discipline and rewards built into them: you need
to have both a carrot and a stick. You need a carrot
because, as I have already argued, when entrepreneurs
find that there are no extra profits or rents to be obtained
from engaging in cost discovery, they will be reluctant
to invest in it, and that is not what we want. There will
therefore need to be carrots: rewards for entrepreneurs
who make this kind of new investment, even though
we know the risks of bottling up resources in activities
that may potentially end up being unproductive and
may also create potential for rent-seeking. So in general
terms these arrangements need to combine the carrot
and the stick, that is to say, they should encourage
investments in non-traditional areas, while weeding out
the investments that fail. Taking this standpoint, we may
evaluate the industrial policy frameworks of different
kinds of countries. East Asia, for example, is famous
for having combined both the carrot and the stick:
investors in South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore were
showered with different kinds of incentives –export
subsidies, tax incentives, credit subsidies and so forth–
but there were also very clear performance standards,
often but not always based on export performance, and
when these standards were not fulfilled, these
governments were quick to punish the firms or withdraw
their incentives, so it is now generally recognized that
a large part of the success of East Asian industrial
policies was due to the fact that they combined the carrot
and the stick: they did not only offer incentives.
The import substituting industrialization (ISI) phase
in Latin America, in contrast, was a case of mostly carrot
and no –or very few– sticks, because under ISI firms
were basically protected with higher levels of import
barriers and were subsidized through negative interest
rates and so forth, but there was very little in the system
to ensure that the firms that ended up not performing
as expected and became failures would have their
subsidies withdrawn, so that those resources could be
released for more productive activities. What happened,
I think, under ISI was that, while that system produced
a number of world-class industries in Latin America, it
also produced a very wide range of inefficient sectors
and activities that were allowed to keep on operating
for far too long because it provided incentives but no
punishment for unsatisfactory performance.
In the 1990s in Latin America, there was a 180
degree turnaround in the incentives structure: firms and
entrepreneurs now faced all the discipline in the world,
because they had to operate in markets with no
protection, open to international competition, and there
were no incentives because it was impossible to seek
help from governments, since they were no longer able
to provide it. In that decade, Latin American firms were
in an environment with as much stick and as much
discipline as one could imagine, but too little carrot:
hardly any incentives.
What I think has happened in these circumstances
is that the firms which have done well have done very,
very well indeed, as reflected in the high productivity
rates of those industries that have survived, but clearly
there has not been enough investment in new activities,
so that those extraordinarily high productivity levels
had not spread to the rest of the economy: a huge gap
has developed between the aggregate productivity level
of the economy and the level of the firms which have
been successful. In Latin America, there was no process
like that observed in Asia, as registered in the “gang of
four” countries in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and, more
recently, in China, where basically the whole economy
has moved forward, and not just some parts of the firms
or sectors.
The second general principle I should like to
mention is the need to combine a bureaucratic
structure with a certain amount of embeddedness.
Traditionally, economists think of regulation as a top
down process, in which there is a bureaucratic
regulatory agency which, whenever there is
uncertainty in the system, issues a set of rules, expects
the private sector to live according to those rules, but
then keeps that sector at arms length. Thus, there is
only an arms length relationship between the
regulatory body or the bureaucrats and the private
sector they regulate. I think this is a mistaken view of
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how productivity policies should be formulated:
mistaken because, whatever the agency that is
entrusted with formulating such policies, it needs
information, and this information exists first and
foremost in the private sector. It is the private sector,
the firms and investors who know where the obstacles
are: whether they lie in the market, in market
externalities or, as often happens, in problems caused
by government regulations and red tape. It is not the
bureaucracy but the private sector that knows where
the problems are and how they should be solved, and
there therefore needs to be a mechanism whereby the
public sector, the agencies and the bureaucracy in
general can obtain this information from the private
sector. If this is not done – if there is a simple top
down, arms length regulatory model, the policies
imposed may be ineffective or even harmful. The right
model, I think, lies in between these two extremes,
and its objective should be to create a form of strategic
collaboration and coordination between the public and
the private sectors, with the aim of identifying the most
serious obstacles to productive restructuring. So, just
as economic development and productive change are
processes of self-discovery, the kind of arrangement
I have in mind is a process of discovery as well, both
of the opportunities that exist for creative,
collaborative action and of the most suitable types of
instruments for achieving this objective.
VI
Some final reflections
With regard to the general design principles for
industrial policies that I have briefly discussed above,
there are some general conclusions that I would like to
highlight.
One of these is that, when thinking about industrial
policies, what is important is to concentrate on the
process of their generation, rather than on their
outcome. There is a tendency to become obsessed with
the instruments that are to be used: are they going to be
tax credits?, credit subsidies?, export subsidies?, export
processing zones?, and so on. This is equivalent to
overlooking the question of what the policy formulation
process is or ought to be: a process of discovering
precisely what problems are to be solved, in the first
place, before focusing on exactly what type of
instruments are to be used to solve them. Getting the
institutional setting and the process right are the key
considerations in this respect, and I think in general
that applying a first-best policy in the wrong
institutional setting is likely to do more harm than using
a second-best policy in the right setting, for in the latter
case, at least you are going after the right target, even
if your instrument is a second-best one.
Another conclusion is that one should not be overly
concerned about identifying the sectors in which to act.
Once again, the process is what matters: these sectors
should not be selected on the basis of some
preconceived idea of what they are, but should ideally
emerge naturally from this kind of collaborative
process, and I think eliciting information on the private
sector’s willingness to invest in the different areas,
subject to removal of the obstacles in question, is an
essential part of the process of considering sectoral
priorities. Finally, an important implication emerging
from all this is that the key to applying successful
industrial policies is not the ability to “pick winners”
but the ability to discard losers. The usual argument
against industrial policy is that governments are
incapable of picking winners, and that is absolutely
right, but I think that it is the wrong way of looking at
what it is that we are trying to do. If the process of
productive change outlined above is correct, then it is a
process of experimentation, where there is a lot of
uncertainty about which investments will work and
which will fail. This uncertainty prevails not only in
the public sector, but also in the private sector, so it is
inevitable that, even with optimal policy configurations,
some of the investments promoted will end up being
failures. Indeed, if none of them end up in this way,
this would be a sure sign that not enough is being done,
because the logic is that if you have a portfolio of
projects, some of them are going to be successes, but
some will be failures. If it turns out that all the projects
which received investments are successful, this means
that not enough has been invested, since the return has
been much higher than could reasonably be expected.
So it is not a case of not making any mistakes at
all. The distinction between policy regimes that are
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going to work and those that will not, is that some policy
regimes are self-correcting and incorporate a
mechanism for recognizing mistakes and gradually
withdrawing support from them. That is, by and large,
what happened in the most successful cases of industrial
policies in Asia and, in a lot of cases, it is also what has
been happening in China. So the key institutional
capacity, the key institutional design feature that needs
to be incorporated in any such policies is a true
automatic sunset clause which operates by making the
incentives or promotion regimes temporary, by building
in periodic reviews, by ensuring that there is
accountability, by ensuring that the reviews are
transparent and open for all to see, and, in short, by
providing mechanisms whereby, when ventures are
failing, there are automatic processes that cause support
to be withdrawn. Using this kind of approach is
obviously much less demanding than assuming
omniscience, as happens when it is assumed that
industrial policies should not be formulated unless one
can pick winners, for only if one were omniscient could
it be assumed that one would never make a mistake
and would always pick winners. The incorporation of
an automatic sunset clause in industrial policy
considerably reduces such unrealistic demands: it just
requires the capacity to recognize a mistake.
For reasons already explained earlier, it is
impossible (and undesirable) to specify ex ante the
policy results that the type of architecture discussed
above will yield. Everything depends on the
opportunities and constraints that will be identified
through the collaborative process. Nonetheless, it is
possible to list (see box 2) some general “design
principles” that can help in the formulation of industrial
policies.
A consensus currently seems to be emerging
regarding the broad lines of what an appropriate growth
strategy for developing countries should be like. In this
emergent consensus, a key role is assigned to
macroeconomic stability, and while I have not said
much about this, except in relation to exchange rate
policy, I would certainly agree that macroeconomic
stability is a necessary although often not sufficient
condition for growth.
 Another key element in this emergent consensus,
besides macroeconomic stability, is the importance of
high-quality institutions, especially in the case of the
regulatory framework. While this is perfectly true, I
think there is currently too much emphasis on
institutions as an economic development strategy: in a
sense, the market fundamentalism of a few years back
is now being replaced by institution-based
fundamentalism. While I am absolutely convinced that
high-quality institutions are a sine qua non for long-
term economic development, their effects are not so
evident when most of the action is in the short term: it
takes a long time to build institutions, and there is
evidence that you can get a lot of growth with the
institutions that you have, if you are creative and
imaginative. Although the evidence we have is that you
do not need a very ambitious programme of institutional
reform in order to get growth going, however, you will
nevertheless eventually need high-quality institutions
in order to catch up with more advanced countries. If
China continues to grow at its present rate, it will have
to make an inordinate number of institutional reforms,
even though it must be admitted that so far it has
achieved outstanding growth with very little
institutional reform. I would suggest that, instead of a
very ambitious agenda of institutional reform at the
Box 2
TEN DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION POLICIES
1. Provide incentives and subsidies only for “new” activities.
2. Establish clear benchmarks and criteria for success and failure of subsidized projects.
3. Build in automatic sunset clause for subsidies.
4. Target economic activities (technology transfer or adoption, training, and so on), not industrial sectors.
5. Subsidize only activities that have clear potential to provide spillovers and demonstration effects.
6. Vest the authority for carrying out industrial policies in agencies with demonstrated competence.
7. Make sure agencies are monitored closely by a “principal” who has a clear stake in the outcomes and has
political authority at the highest level.
8. Make sure implementing agencies maintain channels of communication with the private sector.
9. Understand that even under “optimal” industrial policies “picking losers” will sometimes occur.
10. Endow promotion activities with the capacity to renew themselves, so that the cycle of discovery can
become an ongoing one.
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outset, which eats up political capital, it would be better
to spend that capital on an explicit growth strategy in
the short term, focused on promoting restructuring and
investment in new industrial activities. This is useful
and perhaps even necessary during the early stages,
when it is important to get the economy going, to endow
the private sector with dynamism, and this calls for an
explicitly production-oriented strategy.
In conclusion, I would say that, rather than
necessarily having a specific policy of the kind that I
have been talking about, what is really important is to
have a production-oriented mentality. There is an
enormous difference between a government that has
such a mentality and one that basically believes that
macroeconomic stability and the market fundamentals
are enough to get an economy going: between a
government that actually listens to businessmen, when
they come and complain about something, and one that
assumes that any businessman who comes and asks for
something is a crook. There is a difference between a
government that views the exchange rate as something
that can really make a difference for productive
development, as opposed to one that sees the exchange
rate as a mere equilibrium variable best determined in
the financial market, and finally there is a world of
difference between a government that is actively
thinking about how it can foster productive
collaboration with the private sector in order to identify
or at least help to identify new investments and areas
of investment and ways in which it can organize itself
to provide the best kind of support, and a government
that basically considers that productive restructuring is
a process that will take care of itself and that it is not
the government’s job to get involved in it.
